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IT DEPENDS: THE 
MATURITY OF 
CULTURAL 
ECONOMICS AND ITS 
PUBLIC POLICY 
DEBATES 
Terence Durrant II 
Abstract 
This paper explores a few core cultural economic theories such as Baumol’s Cost 
Disease and Crowding out/Crowding in effects, and it delves in the why, the how, 
and the how much of the public subsidy debate within economics. It asses all of 
these topics using an academic life cycle framework to determine if the field of 
cultural economics is mature enough to truly be giving recommendations to 
government. The author finds that there is conflict in terms of policy implication 
and a lack of data. Leading to the discovery that the field of Cultural Economics 
is not mature enough to be used in public policy debates. 
 
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the course Senior 
Seminar (EC 375), during the Spring Semester of 2019 
 
While writing this thesis, I have not witnessed any wrongdoing, nor have 
I personally violated any conditions of the Skidmore College Honor Code. 
 
I. Introduction 
The field of cultural economics has been around since 1982. Before that, cultural economics was 
known as the economics of arts and culture. Research has been done in the field since the 1960s, but 
according to David Throsby 1982, “it was not until around 1975 that serious research in the area became 
well established” (Throsby 1982, p.242). Moreover, the field has its own well-established journal that 
started publication in 1976. Despite the field being around for over 30 years, it still remains one of the 
more hotly contested fields of economic study alongside sports economics and the economics of heath 
and healthcare. 
The field of cultural economics has many areas of discussion such as, artists labor markets, 
Baumol’s Cost Disease, crowding out/crowding in, demand and supply, donor governance, industrial 
organization, taste formation, and the art market. Many discoveries have been made and expanded upon 
in the field. This paper will cover Baumol’s cost disease, the crowding out/crowding in discussion, and 
the overarching discussion behind public subsidies in the arts in terms of the why, the how, and the how 
much. One of the most common applications of these theories are their policy implications for public 
goods, specifically nonprofits. The paper will look to delve into the policy implications of these various 
topics within cultural economics. 
The paper will specifically answer the question: Have the public policy theories in cultural 
economics reached the appropriate phase in the academic life cycle to be accurately applied in practice? 
The paper will look to update the progress that has been made in each of the respective areas. 
Furthermore, it will look to examine if cultural economics has truly reached all of the phases of the 
academic life cycle, as well as examining if cultural economics has embraced modern economic theories 
and applied them to their expansion of the field. The rest of the paper will be as follows: Section II is the 
Framework, Section III is on Baumol’s cost disease, Section IV is Public subsidy for the Nonprofit arts 
beginning with the Why? (Theoretical Arguments) followed by the  How Much? Then ending with the 
How? A means to an End, then Section V is Crowding Effects, Section VI is Results, Section VII is 
Implications, and  Section VIII Conclusion. 
 
II. Framework 
The Framework that will be used in this paper was created by cultural economist Bruce A. 
Seaman (2009). The schema has not been explored in many other papers, so it is fairly challenging to 
expand upon. His Schema was the first one to examine the field of Cultural Economics in this manner. It 
used examples from adjacent fields in economics such as Industrial Organization and Sports Economics. 
Seaman explains how the framework fits in these other realms and then applies it to Cultural Economics. 
With each comparison, he further engages the reader in the definitions within the framework. Based on 
his comparisons to other fields and applications of the framework, he finds that there was fragmentation 
and consolidation phases within the field which causes there to be a diversion in the literature that 
eventually comes back together in the final backlash stage. This framework is incredibly subjective and 
can be applied to multiple sub-disciplines within the field of Cultural Economics. Seaman applies the 
framework to Cultural Economics as a whole but does not go in depth within subfields of Cultural 
Economics. This paper extends the literature by using the framework and applying it to the previous 
research within the specific subfields. It then continues to apply the framework to the greater field of 
Cultural Economics.  
Seaman titled the first stage “Foundation,” which is fitting because this stage lays the groundwork 
for all the future research to be built upon it. This stage is all about the basics and fundamental theories 
that spur disciplines. The key factor in this stage is that the framework is compelling but limited. It allows 
other economists to expand upon it due to their passions. This initial stage can have some empirical 
evidence supporting it but is not a requirement. 
The next stage was called “Maturation,” because the theory from the previous stage is expanded 
upon. The research goes beyond the limits of the previous theory and economists can  use their passion to 
add new nuances to the original theory. In this stage the original framework may be questioned a little bit, 
so it leads researchers to utilize tools from other realms of economics and apply it to this field. The 
emphasis in this stage is the use of rigorous analytical frameworks to evaluate the efficacy of the original 
theories. After this in-depth analysis, the results are used to influence policy decisions. 
The third stage is the “Reevaluation” stage where everything is questioned. By this point, the 
theories from previous stages are known by most practicing researchers. This is the stage for all the 
skeptics who question whether the theory is actually an accurate depiction of what is going on in society. 
In addition, the skeptics may question whether the empirical findings are actually capturing the correct 
variables and answering the correct questions. Moreover, researchers begin to question if these results are 
then being applied correctly in terms of policy implications. The revaluation stage allows there to be 
doubt in the field which causes the original theorists to answer a few lingering questions. 
The final stage is called “Backlash,” which is simply the answer to the “Reevaluation stage.” The 
believers of the “Foundation” or “Maturation” stages will have to answer the questions presented in the 
“Reevaluation” stage to maintain the validity of their research. More often than not, the “Backlash” stage 
questions whether the added sophistication in the “Reevaluation” phase makes the model less realistic for 
society. The defendants may also wonder whether these questions are substantive and furthering the field 
(Seaman 2009) 
 
III. Baumol’s Cost Disease 
In the “Foundation” stage, William Baumol and William Bowen describe what they call a disease 
in their seminal paper. Some claim their paper is the foundation stage of Cultural economics as a whole, 
as it was the first paper to discuss the topic, and therefore has become the main foundation of the theory 
itself. They begin to explain that there is a special attribute of the arts cost structure. They call this 
phenomenon the “cost disease,” which is where the cost of live performances continues to rise faster than 
the cost of a typical manufactured good. (Baumol and Bowen 1966) In the paper Baumol and Bowen 
continue to explain that over the years  cost structure of nonprofit arts organizations has not improved 
because they have not gained any real benefits from technology due to labor saving innovation. This is 
because it still takes the same number of man hours and people power  to write and play a piece by 
Purcell or Beethoven. This fact still rings true today, for when you go to your local orchestra you will still 
see the same number of players as you would have seen 100 years before. Furthermore, performers still 
have to work the same number of hours to learn and practice the piece. 
During the “Foundation” stage Baumol and Bowen compare the arts market to the watch making 
industry. Baumol and Bowen would use the example of a modern swiss watchmaker being able to make 
1200 watches in the time a watchmaker used to make only 12 due to technological advances. In addition, 
the costs of watches and other manufactured goods have plummeted while the live arts have become more 
expensive. One of the key gaps that Baumol and Bowen left out during the “Foundation” stage is the 
theory that mass media, film, and radio would not incur the same cost disease. Their paper was also a 
breakthrough for public support for the arts. It gave arts supporters a major argument for incurring federal 
support. The cost disease shows that the arts should be subsidized due to their cost structure. In addition, 
the cost disease describes some of the problems that we may be witnessing today in the arts due to 
underfinancing. This was labeled by W.E. Oats as the “fiscal illusion” and he’s quoted as saying: 
Cost Disease implies that cost of performance will rise faster than the general price level. 
If government support only increases only marginally faster than the price level 
politicians will conclude that the quality the public is receiving is declining. 
Mismanagement is likely to be blamed and budgets will be trimmed and that would put 
support levels lower than the public’s actual preferences (Baumol 1987, p. 843). 
 
This a noteworthy argument as it is something that the arts industry is currently experiencing. 
Government support has been rapidly decreasing over the past few years for the fine arts. More often than 
not, mismanagement is the usual excuse when a nonprofit goes under. Moreover, nonprofit budgets have 
also become small and continually focused on cost-cutting, which creates an interesting theoretical 
observation that we might be witnessing today. 
 As mentioned earlier, there was a key gap left within the foundational literature because it was 
assumed that media, film, and radio would not experience the cost disease. It only makes sense that this 
theory would need to be tested. To kick off the “Maturation” stage of the literature, Hilda and William 
Baumol went on the test the original hypothesis in 1984. In the paper, they analyze whether the cost 
disease can be felt within the mass media industry. The Baumols discovered that the television 
broadcasting industry has a cost structure that is asymptotically stagnant. According to the theory, the 
industry begins with an initial decline in costs and then begins to behave like the costs within the 
performing arts. Hilda and William Baumol include a data table and graph that shows the ticket prices of 
films, dramas, and musicals from 1948 until 1983. In all of these industries the prices go up, but the film 
industry’s prices are increasing at a much faster rate. When looking at the assumptions of the theory they 
do make one possibly faulty assumption to allow the theory to work. The Baumols assume that there are 
two major attributes of the film industry. One of these attributes is completely stagnant, while the other is 
technologically driven. Baumol assumed that the technology driven input would eventually begin to 
decrease costs at a decreasing rate. This faulty assumption allows the stagnant attribute to take over and 
cause the cost disease to take effect. Unfortunately, that is not how innovation works in the real world. 
Innovation is always at play within industries, and it often will decrease costs at an increasing rate as the 
industry grows. This would force them to rethink whether or not the cost disease truly applies to the film 
industry based off of the two inputs. This questioning of assumptions is the basis of many of the papers 
within the “Reevaluation” stage. 
 One of the key players in this stage was Tyler Cowen, for he never shied away from explaining 
the gaps in Baumol’s original logic. Cowen brings a nuanced approach to analyzing the cost disease. He 
breaks down his analysis based off of two key arguments: innovations in process and product innovations. 
Cowen brings up the fact that the technological advances in recording technology allows thousands of 
listeners to engage in musical performances. He stated that, “Even if the number of musical performances 
does not rise, the quantity of performance output, measured in consumption units, has skyrocketed” 
(Cowen, 1996, p. 208). His argument measures the results of musical performances based on 
consumption units rather than focusing on the labor and man hours required to put it on. Unfortunately, 
Cowen’s nuanced argument does not address the cost aspects despite being a valid point. He furthers the 
argument by bringing up the claim that quartet production does not differ from industries because there 
are some irreducible labor costs in manufacturing. Cowen goes on to say that, “Short of complete 
automation of the entire firm, including upper level management, all production processes involve some 
irreducible amount of labor” (Cowen 1996, p. 209). This point addresses the costs in a logical fashion. 
Every firm experiences some sort of labor costs because many of them are indeed closer to fixed costs. 
Thus, Cowen’s original arguments are not a direct rebuke on the cost disease itself but rather raise 
philosophical considerations on how we are measuring productivity. 
 In the area of product innovation Cowen questions Baumol’s fundamental assumption of keeping 
both inputs and outputs fixed. In this example the inputs are four musicians, a quartet, and the output is a 
classical music performance. Cowen claims that when doing this, “the postulate comparison eliminates 
new ideas as a source of productivity improvement. The Mozart example makes the performing arts 
appear stagnant by treating music creation as fixed, unchanged activity” (Cowen 1996, p.209). This is a 
valid point because when compared to the automobile industry, it would also appear stagnant when the 
final product and production process are fixed. He goes on to acknowledge that all industries suffer from 
time to time with a lack of creative labor. This would show that the arts are not very different from other 
industries at all because the cost disease does not focus on the value added in productive process. He says 
that a proper comparison must account for the increasing diversity within the arts. This is an important 
point because the arts are a creative industry and eliminating that creativity would automatically put it at a 
disadvantage when compared to other industries. Furthermore, Mozart’s symphonies are not the only 
pieces of music that are performed because new pieces are continually being created by modern day 
composers. They include different labor inputs and different instruments. He goes on to make the 
analogy, “The modern world does not produce the Model-T more cheaply, it produces a better car 
altogether. If the cost disease is restricted to products of constant quality, it will be largely irrelevant for 
long term growth, which brings new products in all spheres of life” (Cowen 1996, p. 210). This is another 
great counterpoint given that orchestras now play what is called “pops” music. Orchestras will play pieces 
from famous movies, musicals, and even some popular modern music. This would be called a new 
product in any other industry and would lead to the cost disease to compare apples and oranges. Lastly, 
Cowen points out that many of these authors focus on high culture when measuring these effects. When 
looking at more popular, modern music, you would possibly see different results. In addition, the data 
indicates that the number of high culture organizations, whether opera companies or symphony 
orchestras, have all increased from 1965 to 1990. The industry is clearly growing for some reason and 
increasing costs in an industry would not lead to so many new entrants. 
 Cowen raises valid points, but Baumol’s Cost Disease is still used to this day as a policy and 
discussion topic. In the field of welfare and discussion of the role of the state, Baumol’s Cost Disease is 
found to be robust especially because of how the theory has evolved (Andersen 2017 and Semat 2019). 
These papers are not focused on the arts at all, but they give insight to the other uses of Baumol’s Cost 
Disease because there is also a growth component to the theory not discussed in the paper. In terms of 
direct studies, such as Anne-Kathrin Last (2011), finds that German theaters are directly affected by the 
Cost Disease. They find that the key driver behind the cost increases is increasing wages as estimated by 
Baumol. This study is good empirical evidence and proof that despite the holes in the theory, there is clear 
empirical validity. Additionally, in direct response to Cowen and natural academic evolution, Baumol 
does evolve the theory over time. One of the major evolutions in the theory was the focus on further 
defining the stagnant activities. In these activities there are labor inputs that cannot be improved by 
technology. Thus, they need a name and definition, or as  Paschal Preston calls them creative inputs 
defined as, “ original ideas, concepts, actions, and inductive solutions to ill-defined problems. Creative 
inputs are provided by creative labor, which is assumed to be irreplaceable by machinery” (Preston 2009, 
p. 243). This clarifies that these new product innovations discussed in Cowen’s critique would be 
considered new products all together. Because the creative inputs that created Mozart are not the exact 
same creative inputs that went into rock, country, and other types of music. They also go further to 
acknowledge the fact that the standardization is the process that turns a stagnant good into a progressive 
good that has the ability to improve with technology and innovation. This additional nuance 
acknowledges that Cowen is right in how new fields are able to be consumed in different manners. 
Moreover, the Cost Disease can be used to determine why the number of musical performances does not 
increase as much as output for other activities (Preston 2009, p.244). 
 
IV. Public Subsidies for the Nonprofit Arts 
Public Subsidy for the Arts: Why? Theoretical Arguments 
 It will be rather challenging to apply the framework to the public subsidy arguments because this 
section will focus primarily on the theoretical arguments behind why the government should subsidize the 
arts. The literature discusses many different arguments, but many do not include empirical data backing it. 
 In the “Foundation” stage, it starts with Baumol’s Cost Disease because, as discussed earlier, it 
leads to some valuable predictions regarding future subsidy of the arts. The field evolved from there 
because there are many arguments in support of the arts. One of the big discussions is whether or not the 
arts are a merit good. If the arts can be qualified as a merit good, then there is a logical reason for the 
government to support the arts financially. The standard definition of a merit good is: goods which some 
people believe should be available and whose consumption and allocation are thought to be too important 
to be left to the private market (Cwi, 1980, p.39). The problem is that the merit good argument is 
relatively subjective because it is not per say an economic argument. It is a strong value judgement that 
will depend on a person’s view and level of advocacy of the arts. The value judgement conflict is exactly 
why it’s difficult to justify this argument as support for public subsidies in the arts. Furthermore, there 
will always be people that will believe that the arts should be subsidized and believe that the arts should 
be subsidized more than it already is. 
 In addition to the merit good argument, authors often discuss the question of whether there is 
market failure in the arts, which would be another good claim for public subsidy. Unfortunately, there are 
not many great arguments for market failure proposed in the literature except for one. The best argument 
for market failure is that the poor cannot afford the arts, so there could be a strong equity argument for the 
arts. Moreover, this equity argument would raise another issue for the policy discussion because the 
equity argument can also be applied to many other fields. In addition, it begs the question of how many 
people want to use the arts that cannot afford it. Also, how much subsidy would be necessary to 
incentivize people to consume the arts? In addition, it would open the comparison even further to other 
goods because what would make the arts so special that the government should subsidize them based on 
the grounds of equity. The only solution to this problem, that stems from welfare economics, would also 
be to subsidize the consumer rather than the producer. That would come in the form of vouchers, which 
has its own extensive literature that will be explored later on in the paper. It is an interesting subsidy 
dilemma because it leads to many other questions as well, such as who would control them, effectiveness, 
and how would this be applied. The other problem is that vouchers would only be a short-term equity 
solution because in the long run you still have to modify people’s tastes in order for them to consume 
more of the arts. The long-term solution is much more difficult because modifying people’s tastes are 
challenging, and it would require there to be more sampling of the arts. These samples would allow 
people to gain a deeper understanding and desire for the arts which would increase demand in the long 
run (or at least increase the consumption from people of lower incomes).  
 There are four externalities that are lauded as benefits the arts can bring to wider society. The first 
is that they help improve national and local identity or pride. It allows people to be proud of where they 
are from and what is going on in their community. In addition, there are economic benefits to the 
community. For example, the audiences that the arts organization brings in bring profits to local business. 
The arts serve as a tool for educating children, and that allows them to critique culture and educate other 
people as well. Lastly, art forms are interdependent, so they help each other create new innovative pieces. 
 Another argument is that the arts must be preserved to help the future generations. Unfortunately, 
this argument is relatively invalid because of the advent of modern technology the digital preservation of 
the arts has become much easier, especially in music, dance, and theater. It is an okay argument for visual 
art, but with digitalization it is quite easy to maintain the existence of these art forms. Furthermore, the 
skills required to produce the art work is passed down from person to person and that allows the form to 
be maintained from generation to generation. In addition, the creative nature of the arts truly means it is 
not like a natural resource because as long as humans have creativity and imagination the arts will be 
around. That means that the arts will never truly die and will not run out like natural resources. 
 In addition, other papers question one of the fundamental assumptions of the public subsidy 
argument. We often assume in the arts that they are being under consumed, but what if they are in fact 
being consumed at their optimal level? The assumption that the arts was unrealistic in the 1980s because 
at that time the consumption of the arts had grown drastically, and it did not hold any merit. The literature 
began to evolve in the “Reevaluation” phase and acknowledged that the past arguments were not valid 
enough to warrant subsidies in the arts. Another theory to support the arts is that the arts are incredibly 
difficult to exclude. In the sense that consumers are able to engage with the arts for free and cannot be 
kept from it. This is also due to mass consumption and mass reproduction of the arts. In addition, it is 
hard to keep secrets in the arts because other artists (producers) draw inspiration from each other. In 
addition, in visual art you can simply copy what the other artist did with acute observation. That means 
that one of the main reasons why the arts should be subsidized is due to their market structure. (Abbing 
1997; Peacock 1991; Fullerton 1990) 
Public Subsidy in the Arts: How Much? 
Throsby and Whithers delve into the public support for the arts in their 1985 article What Price 
Culture. In this article, they deep dive into the results of their survey of the arts in Australia. The survey 
tried to target people in the community that are required to contribute to the arts through taxation. The 
1982 survey was a large, randomly selected sample of people over 17 years old. They restricted the 
survey to Sydney, Australia because of cost. This article is written for people that may not have an 
extensive economic knowledge, so they focused on the results and their policy implications. Additionally, 
they left out their econometric analysis and other mathematical formulas because it is highlighted in 
another paper. From their results, they looked to explain the role and nature of the arts in Australia. The 
paper does this by focusing on two specific areas, the community involvement in the arts and the 
willingness to subsidize the arts. 
Many people assume that there is little interest in the arts because many people view it as a high 
class good. Unfortunately, this view was proven wrong thanks to Thorsby and Whithers’ study. They find 
that 4 out of 5 respondents are interested in at least one kind of art whether it be theater, visual art, 
classical music, crafts, ballet, or opera. The key part about these results is that this is for people that are 
interested, so it does not necessarily mean that they participate frequently in the arts. The results are 
positive because it shows that people still have a broad interest in the arts as a whole. Over half of the 
respondents claimed to have been to some type of arts performance within the last twelve months, which 
also a high positive percentage for attendance in the arts. That stats clearly show that the arts are not a 
“high class” activity or a luxury good because people believe in it and attend it. Lastly, they look at active 
involvement in the arts. This is for the people that frequently participate in some form of the arts whether 
it be acting, making crafts, or performing music. They found over a quarter of the population are actively 
involved in some form of the arts. This number can be considered higher than most people would expect 
because it would mean that the arts are not as elitist as people would think even when it comes to the 
people that actively participate. 
In the second section they highlight the willingness to subsidize and they find that people 
acknowledge the importance of the arts to wider culture. A majority of people perceive there to be public 
benefits from the arts and that those benefits are not solely seen by the rich and wealthy. The community 
also recognize the arts’ role in helping people understand culture and the wider world as a whole. They 
believed that the arts can help people evaluate society and help add to a successful democracy. Throsby 
and Whithers also find that, ”the average willingness to pay exceeds current levels of government support 
in Australia” (Throsby p.18, 1985). The willingness to pay in 1982 is $20 per person, but the range of 
their data is anywhere from $15 to $200 per person. These are good numbers considering it would be a 
substantial subsidy for the arts if it were actually employed. Despite their willingness to pay being higher, 
not everyone supports it. Furthermore, they find that just under three quarters of the respondents favored 
an increase in governmental support for the arts. The respondents were willing to finance the increase in 
support by reducing social security spending and defense spending. This is a surprising finding 
considering the current arts climate. It is interesting to see how this survey would change in 2019 and how 
it would be different in the United States. These results could be incredibly different, and it would be 
interesting to see if people still believe in the arts like they once did, especially with the expansion of 
STEM initiatives. From a cultural perspective, it’s not clear that people from the United States would be 
willing to sacrifice defense spending, especially considering our current political climate. There are many 
frequent budget disputes during the current administration, and it would appear that it would be hard to 
pass any legislation even if it is confirmed that people want it. 
In further expansion upon their earlier paper, Throsby and Whithers measure the intensity of 
different forms of bias and free riders to test if their past results can be considered reliable due to human 
behavior. In total, they find that there is a strong free rider problem in these types of surveys, which 
makes it incredibly difficult to study willingness to pay. The finding that free rider behavior is random 
with respect to observable socio-demographic characteristics. That means that many people tend to 
answer the survey questions differently because they actively want to benefit from other’s money. In 
addition, it does not matter sex, age, birthplace, education, or occupation, people will still free ride. It is 
interesting that there is no determinant for race or ethnicity, and that is an area that could have led to more 
meaningful results. In addition, they find that all of the other forms of bias including social choice and 
information bias are all significant. Since the presence of these multitude of problems they have to correct 
their estimates for true willingness to pay. Which they find, after correction, to be $74, which is within the 
range they gave in their last paper as well. 
Morrison and West test the willingness to pay in a similar style survey for Canada. They have a 
cross section sample with 463 telephone interviews. In the survey, they inform respondents of how much 
of their taxes goes towards the arts, $3.35. The results are quite mixed because 39 respondents say it’s too 
little, while 49 believe it’s just right. Despite this fact, a majority of the respondents were willing to pay 
between $6-$9 per annum. Of course, this is an interesting argument that further shows how difficult it 
truly is to decide on how much the arts should be subsidized. 
One of the major findings from these early papers is that many find a number on what the 
willingness to pay could be but cannot be certain because of the survey methods. Also, they find that 
many results are incredibly mixed because the surveys often show that not every single person within the 
survey cares about the arts. Many in fact find that the level to which they are supported is more than 
enough. Moreover, Morrison and West find that their respondents do not perceive many external benefits 
from the arts. This argument to be quite suitable to compare to the U.S. because it much closer to the U.S. 
in geographical distance and similar in demographic characteristics. The hard part is that the countries are 
different politically. Furthermore, with the history of the arts in the U.S. much stronger empirical 
evidence is needed to convince politicians to increase subsidies for the arts. We will see what the later 
2000s papers have to say about the argument. 
The “Reevaluation” stage in this subfield is an interesting because David Throsby offers a unique 
critique to the methods he used in previous papers. In his 2003 piece, he critiques the validity of using 
contingent valuation methods (CVM), which is how he assessed willingness to pay (WTP) in previous 
papers. In this paper, he explains what CVM measures, but also what it leaves out. He explains that CVM 
is only effective when people have proper information regarding the good being assessed. Since we have 
established multiple times, both in the field and in this paper, that it takes acquired tastes to appreciate the 
arts it would mean that not all people have full information with regard to the arts. This is especially 
prevalent because it is not as if we are asking people about national defense or a good which everyone is 
more familiar with it. Another limitation of the CVM technique is that in the past he used it to ask 
consumers their WTP, and as consumers it is hard to quantify how much we are willing to pay because 
we do not know how to represent the value of the good in monetary terms. Since cultural goods are not 
tradable, it makes it hard to quantify in monetary terms. Those that do have experience in the arts would 
be able to give a ball park estimate of how much a ticket or event is worth, so it is difficult to agree with 
this thought process. If this was being used to assess a random pleasure or exchange it would be much 
more difficult to monetarily quantify that experience. In addition, Throsby explains that it would be 
challenging to quantify the value of a good that is experienced by a group, such as the worth of Mozart’s 
music. 
The second aspect to Throsby’s paper that is enlightening is the idea of cultural goods having two 
types of value: an economic value and a cultural value. The cultural value can be, “their aesthetic 
properties, their spiritual significance, their role as purveyors of symbolic meaning, their historic 
importance, their significance in influencing artistic trends, their authenticity, their integrity, their 
uniqueness” (Throsby 2003, p.280). As depicted in the quote, these are all aspects that are not quantifiable 
and are different from the economic value of a cultural good such as a painting or play. Since these are 
two different values, Throsby claims CVM studies will always undervalue cultural goods because this 
type of analysis can only capture the economic value through the WTP. Furthermore, we have to go 
beyond the number crunching and find a way that can assess the true value of cultural goods and how we 
can best help everyone receive that full value. The question is will we be able to improve CVM, or will 
we need to invent a new type of analysis? 
 It was very difficult to find a paper that represents the “Backlash” stage, but this paper by David 
Forrest uses a different type of analysis to assess the levels of subsidies for small repertory theaters. 
Forrest 2000 does a study on small theaters in the U.K. He finds the current level of subsidies to be 
satisfactory because small repertory theaters cannot capture consumer surplus via price discrimination. 
This is not a direct rebuke of the previous literature, but it is a small analysis using a robust regression 
analysis in a small area of the arts. The result cannot be used as justification for maintaining subsidies 
across the arts, but it can be a stepping stone for other researchers to use regressions to analyze the 
validity of subsidies, rather than trying to assess willingness to pay. 
Public Subsidy for the Arts: How? Means to Achieve the Ends? 
 Professor West argues heavily for the use of a voucher system in order to subsidize the less well-
off consumer. It is an interesting argument because it goes against the grain in the means to an end 
argument. Many people solely focus on supply side measures, such as different methods of subsidizing 
the suppliers (producers) of the arts. In this newspaper article, he brings up the great point that the 
primary beneficiaries of the current arts subsidies are the well-educated well-off consumer. He asks, why 
not subsidize the less well-off consumer, and put the power in their hands? 
 He quickly admits that the main reason why this idea of subsidy is often fought is because of 
bureaucracy. Many of the people in charge of arts organizations will quickly become hostile and upset 
because they enjoy having the power in their hands and being able to receive their grants as usual. West 
argues that the government can use this program to focus on the daily non-user of the arts, who is 
typically from a lower income household or still in school (West 1986, p.9). This idea would be good 
because it would help bring in more users that do not often engage in the arts. It would be a strong way to 
help fix long term tastes, and thus fix the taste formation problem with the demand for the arts. 
Furthermore, it would also help maintain a balance of benefits so that middle-and lower-class individuals 
can also gain the benefits of the arts. This would only be useful if politicians view the purpose of 
subsidies as to help with income inequality. This of course would only be a useful argument if it had ever 
been applied. 
 West educates the reader on the British voucher experiment that started in September of 1968. 
They kept the program running for 13 years and then mysteriously shut it down. The best part is that by 
1979 the ticket scheme was associated with 125,000 admissions per year. In addition, the costs to 
administer the plan was 840 pounds for printing, 720 pounds for postage, and some secretarial time. This 
is not expensive for such a program. Northern Arts, the Arts Council subsidiary running the program, did 
a survey between April and November of 1979-1980 to try and find out the usefulness of the vouchers. 
Participating organizations were upset because it was an inappropriate time to survey ticket usage since 
the organization was closed. Therefore, there was no use for the vouchers. In addition, a couple of 
theaters saw increase in usage among young people and claim that they work, but that did not stop 
Northern Arts from shutting down the program. West points out it is hard not to conclude that the 
program was shut down because of public arts bureaucracy that was acting in its own interest that prefers 
policies that subsidize the producers rather than the consumers of the arts (West, 1986, p.10). 
 Similarly to Britain, there was a voucher experiment started in New York in 1972 by the Theatre 
Development Fund (TDF). William Baumol completed a survey of the coupon audience in 1974, and 
found that the scheme was quite successful, especially in bringing in new audiences from different ethnic 
groups. African-Americans and Hispanics were the two ethnicities that benefitted from the vouchers. In 
addition, his survey showed that 9% of the coupon users were over the age of 60, which compared to 5% 
of normal theater audiences. Overall, it showed that it was great for getting diversified audiences within 
the theater. “By the end of its first season coupons had brought income to over 80 ‘off-off-Broadway’ 
groups. In the next Season it had reached 127 groups (West 1986, p.11). These are nice numbers because 
they show that the effects are helping smaller theater organizations and growing in its effects. These are 
all positive signs for theater within the U.S. It also allows for these smaller theaters to survive and grow 
rather than relying solely on the bigger Broadway theaters. 
 The only problem with this argument is this type of service would not work with all views of the 
arts. If people believe that consumers do not know what is truly good for them, then the voucher system 
would not be effective. In terms of the “merit good” argument, it would be effective because it would 
allow consumers to go to the organizations that they value, and it would mean that unpopular 
organizations simply wouldn’t be used. That means the ones that people do not like would go out of 
business. The U.S. program spread from New York, Buffalo, and Chicago, so it would be interesting to 
see where it is now. 
 In a counter-critic, William Grampp points out that the arts should not be subsidized at all. This is 
because of the vast debate cited from the why section that it depends on your evidence. West cites it being 
a merit good and because of positive externalities argument, which was discussed as not being strong 
arguments. Furthermore, West cited a source that yielded mixed results. There were many positive 
aspects to the program, but the most popular theaters that specialized in classics are the ones that received 
most of the vouchers.  
 In addition, Grammpp goes further to say why would you solely give the vouchers to the poor? 
Why not subsidize everyone if the good is indeed a merit good? The assumption of a merit good is that 
everyone is under consuming the good, so why not subsidize everyone not just the poor. Also, the poor 
would probably prefer to receive something much more beneficial to them than tickets to a culture event. 
That means they are more likely to sell the vouchers to gain their true desire, money. If that is indeed the 
case, why not just give the poor money? This argument is backed by the fact that other studies have 
shown that not everyone is into the arts, so it does not make sense to give out vouchers when some people 
would not spend money on the arts even if they were free. 
 Grampp points out that when you look at the averages of the Baumol survey that not much 
changed, which is not an encouraging sign for the usefulness of the vouchers. Moreover, the increase in 
older people were not new consumers of the arts. They were simply older people whose retirement 
income no longer allowed for them to attend the theater like they used to. In addition, there had to be a 
special rule implemented just to allow Blacks and Hispanics to enjoy the use of the program. He 
concludes by saying that as long as the arts are private, the people that want it should be the ones to pay 
for it (Grampp (1986/7). 
 Ruth Towse enhances the literature by pointing out that the various arguments for why the arts 
should be subsidized, as each require a different type of subsidy. This is because all the reasons have 
different restrictions, so the method of subsidy would have to be different in order to have the desired 
impact. She claims that the word subsidy does not matter because it can take many different forms such 
as: a lump sum payments through a grant, an exclusion from taxation for companies or donors, or it could 
be incremental payments. According to Towse, the national prestige argument means that subsidies can 
only go to large firms that help enhance the nation and culture as a whole. These types of subsidies would 
be detrimental for the smaller firms in the arts because it would discourage them from doing daring and 
creative production. It would encourage art that is all similar or the classics, and it will cause many 
financial troubles for the smaller organizations. The risk and uncertainty argument would imply that 
subsidies should only go to smaller firms to help build audience attendance to help the future generations. 
In order to monitor this objective, the government would need exact stat tracking to ensure that these 
relevant goals are being met. 
 Many people believe that the subsidies should indeed be used to increase access, but Towse finds 
the same as many others in the past. The subsidies often increase attendance among the more well off, and 
people are not bothered by increased prices. That means that the real conflict is the goal of the means. 
Should it be efficiency or equity? In the end, it is hard to determine what the focus should be on. 
Economics is good at telling policy makers why or how to subsidize the arts, but how much is a different 
task. It is hard to give a definitive answer because we have only asked consumers their willingness to pay 
and their willingness to increase taxes. Moreover, there will never be enough funding for the arts because 
demand will always be higher than the supply. This is because supply seems to be creating demand. That 
means that further empirical research will need to be done in order to help figure out how many people 
want the arts. In addition, we need to know how people would be willing to pay for the arts and if it 
should be done at all. Assuming that we should, we will next examine how the current set up for public 
funding affects arts organization through the examining of the crowding effects. (Towse 1994) 
  
V. Crowding Effects 
 The effects of crowding are a debate that has long been argued since the inception of economics. 
Another name for the argument is whether government funding and private donation are complements or 
substitutes. In the nonprofit realm it is just called crowding in or crowding out. The public economics 
literature began in the 60’s and 70’s. The more relevant theories stemmed from neoclassical economics. 
In the “Foundation” stage of the crowding argument, everyone fully believed that there was what some 
would call, “complete crowding.” This is based off of the, “pure altruism.” The fundamental assumption 
in this model is that private charity is motivated by altruism. This altruism would lead to dollar-for-dollar 
crowding of private charity by public transfers. In these earlier arguments, they also focus on charity as a 
whole and have not yet focused in on any specific types of nonprofits, thus the models created are based 
on the aggregates. The paper also uses microeconomic modeling to theoretically prove the model and 
look at aggregate data from various sources to prove their point. Based on the government’s actions 
creation of more initiatives to help the poor in the 1930s, they saw that many nonprofits and altruists 
payed less attention to the poor causes. Roberts specifically claims, “As government takes over this task 
our compassion turns to imperfect substitutes: counseling services, alleviating the diseases that afflict 
children, and helping the less fortunate of other nations” (Roberts 1984 p. 146). It naturally makes sense 
that nonprofits would shift their attentions to other causes because they cannot provide the help that 
government agencies can. That is strictly because of funding alone, and in a world with limited resources, 
most nonprofits are better off using their resources for a cause that is not being served.  
It is interesting to discuss the maturation stage, because in the crowding argument many of the 
advancements are not in chronological order. In addition, the original discovery during the “Foundation” 
stage acknowledges the fact that there is a possibility of a spectrum. In James Andreoni’s 1990 paper, he 
actively questions the validity of the pure altruism model. He advocates for the idea that some people give 
because of the prestige, respect, and “warm glow” gained from giving. The impure altruism model 
changes the simplifying assumptions of the previous model. As Andreoni says, “Impure altruism, 
however, assumes that people are not indifferent between these alternatives: all else equal, they prefer the 
bundle with the most warm glow” (Andreoni 1990 p.468). This varies from the original assumption of the 
previous model because previously people were assumed to be indifferent of whether the dollar goes to 
the poor via their hands or from their pocket through taxes. This paper still fails to use econometric 
methods to prove its point. It uses heavy theoretical calculus to prove their point via estimating the 
relative income and price elasticities. They do find that the impure altruism model leads to results that are 
drastically different from the previous model. They also lead to more intuitively logical results, such as 
partial crowding effects rather than a dollar for dollar crowding. When you consider the logic behind it, 
dollar-for-dollar crowding wouldn’t make sense because in the real world there are organizations that 
have respectable levels of both public and private donation. As is textbook for the “Maturation” stage, it 
expands upon the original theory, and modifies the assumptions to allow for further discovery. 
One of the papers that bridges the “Foundation” and “Maturation” stage, that is also highly cited, 
tries to find out if the dollar-for-dollar crowding is applicable on a specific type of nonprofit rather than 
looking at aggregate measures. In the paper Kingma focuses on public radio because it receives federal 
funds, state funds, and private funding, so it allowed him to look at varying effects at different levels. He 
uses a cross-sectional data set with 63 different radio stations and 3,541 individual observations. His 
initial summary statistics lead to the discovery that contributors to public radio, on average, have higher 
incomes and are better educated. From his Tobit model he finds: 
That a $10,000 increase in government funds for public radio results in a $0.15 decrease 
in an agent’s contribution. Given that the average public radio station has 9,000 members, 
this implies a total crowd out of $1,350, or an $8,650 net increase in funding. Since this 
level of crowd-out is significantly less than dollar for dollar, the pure public good model 
of charity is not appropriate in this case (Kingma 1989, p. 1203). 
 
This is one of the most interesting findings of this paper, because Kingma proves that the impure altruist 
model is more accurate. It empirically negates the idea of the dollar-for-dollar crowd out. Furthermore, he 
hints at the argument that the overall effects of crowding out may be negligible, so does it really matter? 
Unfortunately, he does not delve further into this implication in the paper but is something that will be 
discussed in the policy implication section. 
Payne chooses to focus her research on the crowding effects of shelters, human services, crime, 
and other types of nonprofits. She takes a varied approach to Kingma and looks at IRS tax return data 
from 1982-1992. She creates an unbalanced panel with nonprofits that have at least four years of IRS tax 
returns. Payne expects there to be altruistic behavior because of the firms that she chose. She finds via a 
two staged least squares that the crowding out exists, but the effects are only partial. Additionally, she 
finds that donors from more liberal states are more likely will donate unlike donors in states with 
conservative sentiment. It is an interesting finding to consider because this could have some large policy 
implications, because she only measured this based on the state’s governor. It would be interesting to 
expand upon this argument via looking at the current president. Also possibly consider including a 
variable for political affiliation and see if there is a direct correlation to the amount that they donate. It 
opens to door for political economists to include other areas of institutional economics regarding political 
cycles as well. This is a potential area of expansion within the field because not many other papers 
comment on the effect that political cycles or political affiliation has on private donation. 
The next stage (Reevaluation) flips the argument on its head, literally and figuratively. Brooks 
tries to be the first paper to finally explore the possibility that you can experience both crowding out and 
crowding in. He elaborates that you cannot have the goal of increasing both private and public donation, 
because they are competing goals, and it can lead to a “subsidy trap.” As the first paper to claim that 
crowding and leveraging are not mutually exclusive, it requires him to use a different model to test the 
effects. Brooks is the first to imply that the curve for crowding effects could be hyperbolic and concave 
down. That indicates that you could experience crowding in of private giving from public subsidies 
upwards to a maximum point. After that maximum has been surpassed, you will begin to experience 
crowding out. Unfortunately, the maximum point for total revenues is at a different point than the 
maximum for private revenues. That follows the economic logic because total revenues would be 
comprise of both public and private donation, and there is a point to maximize total revenues with a little 
bit of public funding. These relationships are depicted in Graph 1.  
The data used to test his hypothesis came from 253 American symphony orchestras. The final 
data set had 40 observations for eight different years and is regressed using generalized least squares 
(GLS). Brooks finds, “According to this model, the average group 3 orchestra will, ceteris paribus, tend 
to experience a leveraging effect up to about $8,200 in government support per concert; after this point, 
private support will begin to be crowded out” (Brooks 2000, p.458). He finds that one of his groups (the 
middle group with budgets between $1.8M-$5M) of orchestras can leverage up to $8,200 in government 
support per concert before crowding out occurs (which is much higher than I anticipated). It again raises 
the question of how relevant is crowding out if it takes that long for it to begin. Another policy 
implication on top of the fact that it is indeed a parabolic function. Furthermore, he finds that the 
crowding effect is different for different groups, so that means that the crowding argument will affect 
different sized nonprofits in various ways. Most of them experience crowding in, but one group does 
experience crowding out. The group that experienced crowding in was the largest level of nonprofits, and 
it appears that, due to their size, they do not benefit from increased public donation. This would fit the 
prestige argument because too much public donation for them would indicate bad financial health, thus 
decreasing their public donation. It is unfortunate that Brooks does not discuss this further in his analysis, 
but it is clear that it is a large implication for artistic directors or development directors of large 
organizations. It would indicate that it would be in their best interest to focus primarily on private 
donation and maintaining their own financial health. 
The third and other major finding from this paper and during this stage was problem that occurs 
depending on being long term or short term focused. The short-term effects have been discussed in the 
previous section. In the long run, just as any other microeconomics concept, is comprised of all the 
maximums of the short run. The implication it has for manager is: 
trouble with liquidity or a misunderstanding of the subsidy-donation tradeoff could lead 
to the consumption of a suboptimally high level of subsidies by some firms in the long 
run, which in turn could trap them at levels of total unearned revenues below the 
maximum. Thus, the inability or unwillingness to forego a relatively small amount of 
public funds in the current period (in order to stimulate even more in private donations) 
could represent a significant long-term sacrifice (Brooks 2000 p. 462) 
 
This is an unfortunate situation that mangers could find themselves in. It would mean that some 
companies would have to risk taking on fewer public funds and risk possibly running a short-term deficit 
to try and recover long term profits. That is a difficult idea to propose to board members. Despite it being 
a nonprofit, it would still be a hard sell. 
 The challenge in defining the Backlash Stage in the Crowding effects argument is that when you 
explore the modern literature, there is no backlash. You actively find that Brook’s parabolic suggestion is 
widely accepted, for it follows strong economic logic. The rest of the field has expanded from there to 
branch off in various directions. Rather than try to go through every single detail of every paper or go into 
one specifically, this section will give a broad overview as to where the field has gone since Brook’s 
discovery and some of the key data and implications. 
 There have been multiple studies that have evolved and used Brook’s methodology to confirm his 
research and the effects of crowding in until large sums appear. One of the most interesting branches has 
been the analysis of the National Endowment of the Arts’ (NEA) specific effect on the crowding 
argument. Smith 2003 finds that the NEA provides leveraging effects for dance organization. Finally 
confirming the thought that a NEA grants acts as a prestigious item and helps to bring in more donations. 
He also highlights the need for these dance companies to continue to evolve their program service 
revenue because it has the opportunity to lead to more donations as well. This would also imply that the 
government should continue to fund the NEA, because their funds are important for some arts 
organizations across the US. Unfortunately, that has not been the case; the US has slowly been decreasing 
funding to the NEA. In Dokko 2009 she analyzes the effects of the cut in NEA funding on nonprofit arts 
organizations. She finds that private donations increased about 60 cents for every dollar reduction in NEA 
funding, which gives us another reason to wonder what the true effects are. It implies that research is 
never over, because the effects could be different depending on the art discipline chosen. Moreover, it 
provides to rationalize the governmental decision to cut funding for the arts. The paper also indicates that 
both fundraising staff and the private sector pick up the slack in order to take care of these arts 
organizations. To further complicate the expansion, there is a paper that finally breaks down the effects 
that state, local, and federal funding has while also accounting for individual, corporations, trustees, and 
foundations on the private side. They find that organization characteristics matter when nonprofits are 
trying to attract more charitable revenue. Since the paper entails a more complete model, it means the 
crowding effects of the various areas are small; moreover, it tells arts managers not to focus on one single 
revenue stream. They encourage diversified revenue streams, similar to corporate businesses. This was 
one of the first studies of its kind, so the results will be questioned and contested as the field continues to 
grow (Krawczyk et. al 2017). The only thing that can be said definitively is that this discussion will 
continue evolve for decades. 
 
VI. Results 
The analytical framework is supposed to function as a strong analysis framework for assessing 
the age and maturity of the economic theories driving public policy. It is similar to the industry or product 
life cycle in business which tells us where the future of the field is going, and if there is still room for the 
company to grow. This framework is supposed to help assess the growth potential of this subsection of 
Cultural Economics. Furthermore, it would allow me to come up with where the literature is lacking and 
how it could be improved upon.  
The framework requires you to pay close attention to the arguments being made in every single 
article read, because you have to figure out where specific articles belong in the life cycle. It is effective 
because it allows you to categorize articles much more easily and pair authors together on which sides of 
the arguments they take. In addition, it helps create a mental timeline of how the arguments have 
progressed throughout the years. The framework is helpful in organizing the history and the progression 
of economic thought, but it does not add any knowledge to the issue. It allows for a more linear 
progression in the argument. The idea of the framework is linear in its progression, and that linear nature 
is not overly compatible with the nature of research. Throughout many of the sections I have found that 
research and economic thought is not linear in terms of the chronological order. A major assumption was 
that papers in chronological order would follow the model of the framework. Unfortunately, just because 
papers followed each other in chronological order, it does not mean that they follow each other in the 
progression of economic thought. After the field had progressed to the third phase, a new paper that is 10 
or 20 years after the seminal piece brings it right back to the first phase. It makes it complicated to put it 
in the framework. In addition, because years are such a major factor, it makes it hard to assess the 
boundaries of every single phase because papers from across decades discuss various economic concepts. 
As has been pointed out that economics does not always follow a perfectly linear process.  
In addition, the application of this framework is rather arbitrary. The definition of every single 
phase is arbitrary and can always be up to interpretation. This limitation becomes especially apparent 
when trying to define the “Backlash” stage. It raises the question of can a field be in backlash for more 
than 10 years? If the field started in the 1970s, but you have backlash starting in the 2000s, it does not 
quite make sense that the field has had 19 years of backlash. At times it also felt that due to the definitions 
of the stages it requires you to fit papers to definition that they do not necessarily fit. From a theoretical 
perspective how do we truly know where an economic concept is when we do not know what we do not 
know? Because I am assessing the progress of thought it will be incredibly subjective and can always be 
argued due to the lack of empirical evidence to back it up. 
Overall, the framework is not useful in assessing these very specific subfields that are more 
theoretical in nature. I have not found many other frameworks that have been used to analyze the progress 
of economic thought. It seems that most people prefer to just do survey papers in a standard format that 
covers the sections they are interested in. This analytical framework adds a level of complication for 
writing a survey paper that most authors would not want to embark upon. Moreover, you can still gain the 




 As alluded to throughout the paper this the various topics address many possible implications 
whether it be for managers of nonprofits or public policy. Due to the contested nature of the literature, the 
biggest implication is for nonprofit arts managers. This comes from a paper that could not be put within 
the framework because it was a perfect example of how not all papers can fit in to the framework. Brooks 
1999 finds, “a 10% increase in advertising and promotion expenditures was associated with 19.4% 
increase in private donations and a 26.2% increase in public subsidies” (Brooks 1999, p.40). This paper 
did not fit into the lifecycle per say because it did not find any crowding effects after the Kingma paper. 
However, they found that focusing on advertising could increase all types of donation. This is such an 
interesting finding, because few nonprofits will spend money on advertising. Most nonprofits try to cur 
most operational expenses that they view as unnecessary. This clearly shows a gap in the operation of 
nonprofits that could be increasing their funding overall. The other problem would be that executive 
directors would also have to convince the board that this will be a worthwhile expense that will help the 
organization. It would be well worth it for nonprofits to try this focus because the results could be fruitful. 
Furthermore, nonprofit arts organizations should clearly focus on diversified streams of revenue as 
indicated in the Crowding Effects section, because that is the only true way to survive. That is especially 
important because this implies that nonprofits can try to be run more like for profit corporations because 
at the moment they are not. From a management perspective they should not be run differently, so it will 
cause mangers to reassess how they are financing their organization. 
 
VIII. Conclusion  
For the field of economics as indicated in Appendix A (a table with the framework application for every 
section) the field needs more continued data in the public subsidy discussion no matter what question you 
are answering. As indicated by the framework, it was challenging to find articles that truly fit into the 
backlash stage, so I cannot say that the field of cultural economics is mature enough to answer the key 
public policy questions. The major area for future research is furthering the discussion on why we should 
subsidize the arts. Once that question is answered, we can effectively answer how much to subsidize the 
arts, and what means we should use to do that. As it stands right now, economists can tell you reasons 
why the government should subsidize the arts, but they will also conflict each other and say why that’s a 
terrible reason. In addition, we can give you estimates on how much subsidies can be used, but we cannot 
tell you that they are incredibly accurate. Lastly, we cannot even agree on how they should be subsidized 
because we have not answered the first two questions. One of the greatest things I have learned 
throughout all my economics classes is that there is one answer that you can always use in class and never 
be wrong, and it applies here too. In the case of policy implications for the nonprofit arts organizations, it 
depends. 
 
Appendix A: Graphs and Tables 
 
Table 1: Explanation of Framework 
 
•Sets the groundwork for future research
•It is key that the fundamental framework is limited, but compelling so that 
it can be expanded upon
Foundation
•Goes beyond previously stated limitations in order to expand upon the theory in the 
Foundation Stage
•Utulizes tools from other areas of Economics and applies it to Cultural Economics
•Also uses rigorous analytical frameworks to asses the efficacy of the original theories
Maturation
•Theories from previous stages are known, and skeptics continually question 
assumptions, emipirical findings, and applications
•Poses Questions for original theorists to answerReevaluation
•Proponents of the foundation or maturation stages will answer the questions presented 
in the previous stage
•Questions whther the added sophistication further advances the field and makes the 
model realistic for society
Backlash
Table 2: Framework Application – Baumol’s Cost Disease 
 
 




Table 4: Framework Application – How Much? 
•Basic Theory Summary: the costs of live perofrmance continues to 
rise due to lack of technological labor innovation
•Theorized that the cost disease could not be experienced by radio, 
film, and mass media
Foundation
•Discovery that film experiences the cost disease as well
•Uses basic industry data to emphasize this pointMaturation
•Adds nuance by using a different unit of measurement
•Questions Baumol's original assumptions and makes valid points 
that there needs to be room for product and process innovation
Reevaluation
•Authors acknowledge Cowen's point and include additional nuances 
to account fro the critique
•Further uses of the Cost Diesase, outside of solely the arts, 
maintains the validity of the argument
Backlash
• Baumol's Cost Disease
• Basic supporting arguments such as: Merit 
Goods, Market Failure, and Mixed Goods
Foundation
• Subsequent papers expand upon the possible 
Arguemnts: Externalities, Future Generations, 
Mass Consumption, and Mass Production
Maturation
• They find that the past arguments are not valid 
enough to warrant subsidiesReevaluation
• N/ABacklash




Table 6: Framework Application – Crowding Effects 
•Throsby and Whithers come up with a robust estimate 
of willingess to pay for the arts based off their survey 
in Australia
Foundation
•Expansion of studies into different countries
•Discovery of innefecient survey methods, causing 
corrected estimates
Maturation
•The effectiveness of the methodology is questioned due 
to developments in economic thoughtReevaluation
•Consider other alternative to asking consumers their 
willingess to pay, such as using regression analysis to 
assess the validity of subsidies in the arts
Backlash
• Simple subsidy in the form of lump sum 
payments or grantsFoundation
• Evolution of the voucher argument and 
considering the use of demand side economicsMaturation
• Adding nuance that the subsidy argument can 



























Graph 1: Parabolic Relationship Between Public Subsidies and both Private Giving 
and Total Revenues 
• Complete crowding where there was dollar for dollar crowding of 
private donation in the presence of public donation
•Does not use any Econometric Modeling
Foundation
• Expands from the pure altruist model to warm glow or partial 
crowding effects
•Econometric Models are finally used to prove partial crowding 
effects
Maturation
•Crowding arguments adapts parabolic function for Crowding effects 
and finds that it is possible to experience both effects at onceReevaluation
•Everything from the Reevaluation stage is widley accepted and 
confimred as the prominent theory
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